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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FOR FIREARMS

CHARGE

VENUE IMPROPER

THIRD CIRCUIT FINDS VENUE
IN

DISTRICT

United States v.
PREDICATE OFFENSE OCCURRED. 121 F.3 d 841 (3d Cir. i997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W.
12, 1998) (No. 97-6888).

WHERE

ONLY

Palma-Ruedas,
3456 (U.S. Jan.

The assassinations of Senator Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and President John F. Kennedy prompted Congress' to enact
the Gun Control Act of 1968.2 This legislation included i8 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(I), which in its current form provides for an additional prison
term of at least five years for anyone who "uses or carries a firearm"
while engaged in a federal crime involving violence or drug trafficking.3 Unfortunately, "[t]he hurried consideration"4 of this provision
and its amendments has resulted in interpretive disagreements that
have reduced their effectiveness.5

The Third Circuit recently entered the dispute that exists among
the circuit courts over the interpretation of § 924(c)(I).

In United

States v. Palma-Ruedas,6 the Third Circuit followed the lead of the
Ninth Circuit 7 and held that the government may not try a defendant
under § 924(c)(I) in any venue where the defendant did not use or
carry a firearm, even if the predicate crime may be tried there.8 Because this holding is contrary to Congress's intent to deter the violence
associated with the crimes enumerated in § 924(c)(I), 9 those circuits

that have not yet addressed this issue should decline to follow the decisions of the Third and Ninth Circuits.
In Palma-Ruedas, six members of a cocaine distribution enterprise

kidnapped Ephrain Avendano in Texas and drove him to New Jersey,

New York, and finally Maryland.' 0 The group used no weapons until
it arrived in Maryland, where defendant "Moreno [put a] .357 magnum
to the back of Avendano's neck, making it clear that he was going to
kill him."" Avendano eventually escaped, and the defendants were
1 See, e.g., ii4 CONG. REC. 22,244 (1968) (statement of Rep. Hunt); id. at 22,256 (statement of
Rep. Kelly); id. at 22,263 (statement of Rep. Burton).
2 Gun Control Act of i968, Pub. L. No. 9o-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
3 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I) (i994). This section provides that "[w]hoever, during and in relation to

any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ...for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such
crime... be sentenced to imprisonment for five years .... " Id.
4 Christopher L. Robbins, Note, Double-Barreled Prosecution: Linking Multiple Section
924(c) Violations to a Single Predicate Offense, 49 VAND.L. REV. 1577, i58i (1996).
5 See id. at 1578.
6 121 F3d 841 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3456 (U.S. Jan. 12, i998) (97-6888).
7 See United States v. Corona, 34 F3d 876, 879-81 (9th Cir. 1994).
8 See Paina-Ruedas,II F.3d at 849-51.

9 See United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, x61 (5th Cir. 99S).

10 See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 846.
11 Id.
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arrested.12 All six defendants were indicted, jointly tried, and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey on charges of kidnapping and conspiracy to kidnap. 13 Moreno was
14
also convicted in the same proceeding for a § 924(c)(I) violation.
At the close of the government's case, Moreno moved to dismiss the
§ 924(c)(1) count for lack of venue, arguing that because the gun was
used and carried only inside Maryland, venue could properly lie only
in that state. 15 The government countered that because New Jersey
was a proper venue for the predicate kidnapping offense, it was also a
proper venue for the § 924(c)(1) charge. 16 With no guidance from the
Third Circuit and conflicting analyses by other circuits,' 7 the district
court chose to follow the Fifth Circuit's holding in United States v.
Pomranz's and found New Jersey to be a proper venue for the
§ 924(c)(I) charge. 19
The Third Circuit reversed Moreno's § 924(c)(I) conviction for lack
of venue.2 0 Writing for the court, Judge Lewis 2 1 noted that Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution 22 and Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure 23 require crimes to be tried in the place where
they were committed.2 4 The court explained that, consistent with
these constraints, Congress can "define a crime broadly such that
commission of that crime will likely cross state borders,"25 or "explicitly provide a venue provision for any given offense, as long as the
venue bears some relation to the offense." 26 However, where Congress
12 See id. at 846-47.
13 See id. at 847.
14 See id.

IsSee id.
16 See id.
17

Compare United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 879-8I (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the dis-

trict where the predicate offense took place is an improper venue for a § 924(c)(I) charge if a gun
was not actually used or carried in that district), with United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d i56, 162
(5th Cir. r995) (holding that the district where the predicate offense took place is a proper venue
for a § 924(c)(I) charge), and United States v. Friedman, Nos. 95-CR-x92, 96-CR-i82, 1996 WL
612456, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2996) (same).
18 43 F.3d 156 (5th Cir. 1995).
19 See Palma-Ruedas,121 F.3d at 847-48.
20 See id. at 85i. The court affirmed all of the defendants' other convictions. See id.
at 859.
21 Judge Roth joined in judge Lewis's opinion.
22 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.3 ("The Tral of all Crimes ...shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed ....
").
23 See FED. R. CRin. P. x8 ("Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules, the
prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed.").
24 See Palma-Ruedas, 121 F.3d at 848-49.
25 Id. at 850 (citing CHARLES A. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 302, at 201
(2d ed. 1982)).
26 Id. (citing, as an example, i8 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (I994), which provides that "any offense
against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more
than one district, may be ...prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed").

1136

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 111:1134

does not explicitly indicate an intent to allow for multiple-venue actions, the court must look to the words of the statute27 as well as the
nature of the crime and the location of its commission to determine
venue.28 Having decided that Congress did not explicitly express an
intent to allow for multiple venues, the court used the Ninth Circuit's
"key verb" test to examine the verbs "uses" and "carries" in the statute
and concluded that because those activities occurred only in Maryland,
venue for the § 924(c)(I) charge could lie only in that state. 29
Judge Alito wrote separately to reject the majority's reliance on the
"key verb" test and to suggest that the court should instead "make a
realistic appraisal of the 'nature of the crime' defined by the statute." 30
Judge Alito argued that "the crime of violence or drug-trafficking
crime is a critical element of the [§ 924(c)(I)] offense" 3 1 and "is at the
center of Congress's aim. '3 2 He reasoned that because the predicate
crime in the case occurred in New Jersey, so too did a critical portion
of the § 924(c)(I) offense. 33 Thus, Judge Alito would have held "that
venue for a prosecution under this statute lies in any district in which
'34
the defendant committed the underlying crime.
The Palma-Ruedas opinion rests on the soundness of three premises: that the legal question analyzed in the Ninth Circuit's United
States v. Corona35 opinion is analogous to that posed in Palma-Ruedas;
that Congress must explicitly indicate an intent to allow for multiple
venue actions; and that the legislative history shows no congressional
intent to provide a single proceeding for the predicate offense and the
§ 924(c)(1) charge. None of these premises, however, finds support in
the case law or the legislative history, and thus, neither does the court's
holding in Palma-Ruedas.
The Palma-Ruedas court's decision to follow the Ninth Circuit's
method of analysis in Corona36 undermined the soundness of the
Palma-Ruedasholding because Corona analyzed a different legal question. In Corona, the defendant was tried and convicted in the District
of Nevada on four counts: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, two counts of distribution of cocaine, and a § 924(c)(I)
27
28
29
30

See id. (citing United States v. Barsanti, 943 F.2d 428, 434 (4th Cir. iggi)).
See id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946)).
Id. at 849-51.
Id. at 859 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Anderson, 328 U.S. at

703).
31 Id.

32 Id. at 863 (citing United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d i56, 16o (Sth Cir. 1995); United States v.
Taylor, 13 F3d 986, 993-94 (6th Cir. 1994); and United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F3d 1070,
io83 (5th Cir. 1993)).
33 See id. at 859.
34 Id. at 863.
35 34 F.3d 876 (gth Cir. 1994).
36 See Palma-Ruedas,12 F.3d at 849.
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violation.3 7 On appeal, the defendant argued that Nevada was an improper venue for the cocaine distribution and § 924(c)(I) charges because these substantive offenses took place entirely within California. 3
The predicate crime that took place in Nevada, therefore, was not a
substantive "crime of violence or drug trafficking crime," 39 but rather
the preparatory crime of conspiracy to traffic drugs.
Indeed, the Corona court analyzed a question different from that
posed in Palma-Ruedas,and asked whether "venue [exists] over a substantive crime committed in furtherance of a conspiracy in any district
where venue is proper for the conspiracy charge." 40 The court analyzed the cocaine distribution and § 924(c)(I) venue issues as though
they posed a single question of law.4 1 Applying this framework, the

Corona court cited decisions questioning whether a state in which a
conspiracy takes place has venue over a substantive offense if the conspiracy and substantive offense occur in different states.4 2 The Corona
court noted that cases addressing this question highlighted "the legal
distinction between preparation for a crime and commission of the
crime itself."43 The court explained that "[a]ctions which are merely
preparatory or prior to the crime are not probative in determining
venue."

Although this analysis may be sound when a substantive crime
(such as cocaine distribution) is tried in the venue in which the conspiracy to commit that crime was formed, it is inapplicable to a
§ 924(c)(I) charge that is tried in the venue in which the predicate substantive offense occurred. Whereas conspiracy to commit an offense
and the act of committing that offense are independent crimes, an underlying substantive offense and a § 924(c)(I) offense are not independently chargeable. Thus, although one could be charged for conspiracy
to commit a crime if one did not actually commit the substantive
crime, one cannot be charged with a § 924(c)(I) offense if one did not
commit the underlying substantive offense. In this sense, the underlying substantive offense is an actual element of the § 924(c)(I) offense. 45 "Since the indispensable predicate offense is as important or
essential to the completed offense as the carrying or using of the fire37 See Corona, 34 F.3d at 878.

38 See id.

39 I8 U.S.C. § 924(c)(I) (1994).

40 Corona,34 F.3d at 879 (emphasis added).
41 See id. at 879-81.

42 See id. (citing United States v. Georgacarakos, 988 F.2d 1289, 1293 (ist Cir. I993); United
States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 118, ii88 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Walden,
464 F.2d ioiS, ioi8, 1020 (4th Cir. 1972); and United States v. Jordan, 846 F. Supp. 895, 898 (D.

Nev. 1994)).

43 Id. at 88o (quoting Walden, 464 F.2d at ioi8).
44 Id. at 879-80 (quoting Georgacarakos,988 F.2d at 1293).
45 See Palma-Ruedas, 12 F.3d at 859 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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arm[,] ... it only follows that venue should be allowed where the vio46
lent crime or drug offense occurred."
This conclusion is supported by Corona itself, which states that
"[c]ontinuing offenses may be prosecuted 'in any district in which such
offense was begun, continued, or completed."' 4 7 Because the substantive offense is a necessary element of the § 924(c)(I) charge, it follows
that the venue in which the substantive offense occurs is the place
where the § 924(c)(I) offense is "begun."
The soundness of Palma-Ruedas is undermined not only by the
case law upon which the court relied but also by the legislative history
of § 924(c)(I), which reveals a congressional intent to avoid trying the
predicate offense and the § 924(c)(I) charge in separate proceedings.
The Palma-Ruedas majority cited United States v. Anderson48 for the
proposition that when "Congress has not explicitly indicated an intention to allow multiple venue actions, [the court] remain[s] guided by
the strict language of the Constitution." 49 But Anderson does not actually require an explicit statement of congressional intent to allow
multiple venues; it holds only that when "[t]here is nothing in either
the statute or the legislative history to show [such] an intention on the
part of Congress[,] . ..the locus delicti must be determined from the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it."' S Thus, in determining whether Congress intended to allow
multiple venues, one can look to statements in the legislative history
that imply such intent.
The contentious congressional debates surrounding the scope of
§ 924(c)(I) s ' strongly suggest congressional support for multiple venues. Section 924(c)(I) was first proposed as an amendment to the Gun
Control Act of 1968. The initial proposal would have covered state as
well as federal crimes,5 2 but the substitute amendment ultimately
adopted by Congress limited § 924(c)(I) to federal crimes.5 3 Congress
did not want § 924(c)(I) to cover state crimes because it wanted neither
to vest state courts with the authority to hear the § 924(c)(I) charge in
tandem with the predicate state offense,5 4 nor to allow a state trial for
46 United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d I56, 162 (5th Cir. 1995).
47 Corona,34 F.3d at 879 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994)).
48 328 U.S. 699 (1946).

49 Palma-Ruedas, 121 F3d at 85o (citing Anderson, 328 U.S. at 703).
SO Anderson, 328 U.S. at 703.
51 See generally 114 CONG. REc. 22,229-45, 22,789-93 (1968) (recording a debate in Congress
over the scope of § 924(c)(1)).
S2 See id. at 22,229-30 (statement of Rep. Casey).

See id. at 22,231 (statement of Rep. Poff).
See, e.g., id. at 22,240 (statement of Rep. Celler) (expressing concern that under such a
scheme, "State judges and State courts would be interpreting Federal criminal statutes all over the
country. At the present time those interpretations are limited to Federal judges, who are schooled
in the art of interpretations of the Federal statutes"); id. at 22,790 (statement of Rep. Poff) (ex53
54
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the predicate offense and a subsequent federal trial for the § 924(c)(I)
charge.5 5 Indeed, both opponents and proponents of including state
predicate crimes within the scope of § 924(c)(I) wanted to avoid having
two separate trials.5 6 Moreover, the author of the amendment that
Congress ultimately adopted emphasized that "it would be expected
that the prosecution [of] the basic felony and the prosecution [of the
§ 924(c)(I) offense] ...would constitute one proceeding out of which
two separate penalties may grow."57 Thus, although Congress did not
expressly provide for the situation in which the predicate offense and
the § 924(c)(I) offense occur in different venues, the legislative history
indicates that members of Congress opposed the possibility that the
predicate offense and the § 924(c)(I) offense would be tried in separate
proceedings or in separate courts.
The Palma-Ruedas court's misplaced reliance on the Corona
court's analysis, its misapplication of the Anderson test, and its failure
to examine the legislative history will force federal prosecutors to make
a difficult choice in many § 924(c)(I) cases: expending limited resources
prosecuting the defendant a second time or forfeiting a conviction on
the weapons charge altogether.5 8 The court should have eliminated
this dilemma and reinforced the clear intent of Congress by finding
proper venue for § 924(c)(I) offenses wherever the predicate substantive offense occurred.
plaining that "as a matter of policy this is unwise, principally because it fractures the Federal system spiritually and functionally").
5 See, e.g., id. at 22,238 (statement of Rep. Pepper) ("Some Members, I observe, are concerned
about having two offenses - one tried in the State court.., and another one tried in the Federal
court for the use of a weapon.").
56 Compare, e.g., id. at 22,232 (statement of Rep. Ichord) (opposing the inclusion of state predicate crimes and asking Rep. Poff whether his amendment "contemplate[d a] second criminal proceeding or [whether the defendant would] be tried in the original proceeding where he was first
tried"), with id. at 22,240 (statement of Rep. Pepper) (supporting the inclusion of state predicate
crimes and stating that his amendment "merely solves a dilemma which we have been concerned
about, as to trying a case for robbery in a State court, and then having to go into a Federal court
and have an entirely new trial").
57 Id. at 22,232 (statement of Rep. Poff) (emphasis added).
58 See United States v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 16i (5th Cir. 1995). Both the Palma-Ruedas and
Corona courts rejected this argument, noting that the government has the option of trying the
cases in a single trial if it wants to, and that the government is limited only in its ability to shop
for a favorable forum. See Palma-Ruedas, I2 F.3 d at 850 "[tH]ad the government wanted to try
Moreno on all counts in a single trial, it certainly could have done so in Maryland.... Essentially,
the government wants to have the option of venue."); United States v. Corona, 34 F.3d 876, 881
(9th Cir. i994) ("If the government desired to litigate all these offenses in a single trial, it could
have and should have done so in California."). Although this may be true in these two cases, it
does not hold for all fact patterns. Suppose that Defendants A and B both kidnap Victim V in
Texas, then A withdraws from the criminal enterprise, and B drives V to Maryland, where he
threatens V with a gun. Under Palma-Ruedas,the government would be required to hold a separate trial in each state rather than consolidate all of the charges in one state. Moreover, there is
nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress was concerned with the possibility of
forum shopping by the government.

